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ABSTRACT:

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the use of a redundant system in
improving quality of care in the trauma setting by examining a subset of our
Quality Assurance (QA) program. 531 consecutive abdominal/pelvic CT studies
performed on trauma patients in a Level I trauma center from 08/22/99 to
08/21/00 were retrospectively reviewed. Each case was initially interpreted by a
board-certified or board-eligible radiologist during the emergency department
evaluation and was subsequently reviewed by a subspecialty abdominal imaging
radiologist as part of a QA program. Nineteen were excluded due to incomplete
information being available, resulting in 512 in our study. Cases with discordant
interpretations had follow-up to discern management change. Of the 512 trauma
cases, 153 cases showed discordant readings (29.9%). Review of patient records
demonstrated changes in patient management in 12 cases (12/153; 7.8%). Three
cases (3/153; 2.0%) were reviewed in morbidity and mortality records of the
Department of Trauma Surgery as a direct result of misinterpretations. Six cases
had additional diagnostic imaging studies for re-evaluation; 4/6 cases confirmed
the QA reader’s interpretation while 2/6 cases were shown to favor the initial
interpretations. Our experience suggests that discordant radiologic interpretations
most often do not result in a change in patient management and outcome.
However, the QA program did identify and lead to changes in management of a
number of cases by providing clinically significant additional findings.
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INTRODUCTION:
Human error does occur in life. In a complex system such as medicine, human
error is unavoidable. However, for people involved in medical care, the consequences of
medical errors may be grave leading to serious injury or even death. We cannot simply
accept that errors do occur; we must take action aggressively to study our health care
delivery system, to identify areas of potential errors, and to redesign the system to prevent
errors. Human error in medicine is considered as mismanagement of medical care
induced by factors such as inadequacies in the design of a medical setting for the delivery
of medical care, or cognitive errors of omission and commission precipitated by
inadequate information or inappropriate mental processing of information (1).

Unlike other industries, such as aviation and military, human error in medicine
has not been extensively researched and scrutinized for many years due to many reasons
(2). First, medicine, as one of the most demanding professions, expects perfection from
the providers, physicians in particular. The physicians have a difficult time admitting
their mistakes and are not willing to learn from the errors. Second, the medical
community did not foster a safe culture of reporting medical errors. In aviation, a safety
culture is more than a set of guidelines; it is a behavior that governs the culture and belief
of every member. With the existence of confidential incident reporting systems, pilots
feel safe to report potentially disastrous incidents, and the industry in turn makes
necessary changes for future prevention. On the other hand, in medicine, when it comes
to errors, the focus has been on assigning blame to the person or the department
associated with the error, rather than identifying the factors that contribute to the error.

2

Therefore, the topic of medical errors has not garnered much public attention despite
some landmark studies published in the literature. For example, in 1991, the Harvard
Medical Practice Study, a review of more than 30,000 charts from 51 New York
hospitals, revealed adverse events in 3.7% of hospitalization (3). In 1994, Dr. Leape, one
of the authors of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, called attention to the topic of error
in medicine with the claim that 180,000 people die of iatrogenic injury each year (4).
According to Leape, as many as 60% of these injuries were due to potentially preventable
errors.

However, it was not until 1999 when the Institute of Medicine released the first
report, To Error is Human: Building a Safer Health System, in a series of an Institute of
Medicine initiative to develop a strategy for improving the quality of health care in
America, the subject of medical errors became the focal point of public attention. The
report sent shock waves throughout the medical community as it estimated that up to
98,000 Americans die each year as a result of preventable medical errors which was more
than motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS (5). “Errors” were defined as “the
failure to complete a planned action as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an
aim; not all errors result in harm.” This report was careful not to assign blame on fallible
caregivers but rather to expose the problem of our flawed health care system to prevent
errors. This report called for an immediate action and recommended for 50 percent
reduction in errors over the next five years.

'V

Since the Institute of Medicine report in 1999, there have been numerous reports
to expose, address, and recommend ways to reduce medical errors (6-9). The Quality
Interagency Coordination Task Force responded to the Institute of Medicine report and to
President Clinton by creating a center for patient safety within the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality. Since then, this center in the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality has conducted further research on medical errors and attempted to implement
changes in our health care system as recommended by the Institute of Medicine. In 2001,
the Institute of Medicine released a second report, Crossing the Quality Chasm: a New
Health System for the 21st Century, to recommend a sweeping redesign of the American
health care system and provide overarching principles for specific direction for
policymakers, health care leaders, clinicians, regulators, and purchasers (6). Specifically,
this report recommends that the Congress should create an “innovation fund” of $1
billion for use during the next three to five years to help subsidize promising projects and
communicate the need for rapid and significant change throughout the health care system.
One of the key areas relates to improvement of reporting systems and use of technological
advances.

As we investigate the study of medical errors in the emergency department, we
need to recognize that the emergency department is a unique place in the hospital. The
previous Harvard Medical Practice study reported that 3% of adverse events occurred in
the emergency department (10). Error in the emergency department differs from error in
the rest of medicine (11). First, the nature of a typical emergency department necessitates
intense time pressures to see patients and to triage them. Furthermore, inconsistent
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arrival of patients makes the staff bored and less attentive during slow periods and harried
during busy periods. In addition, most high-risk patients pass through an emergency
department on the way into the hospital. Finally, the emergency department tends to be in
flux where patients may be in any of many locations (in a room, hallway or radiology
suite) and where staff rotate every shift. Thus, the study of medical errors in the
emergency department requires an understanding that preventing error and ensuring
patient safety in the emergency department involves different processes from other
departments in the hospital.

The radiology department also faces unique challenges when dealing with medical
errors since among the types of errors that may affect imaging patients are those due to
misinterpretation. However, radiologic errors due to missed diagnoses are often difficult
to ascertain as observer variation in interpretation does not necessarily represent medical
error (12). Previous studies have investigated the subject of radiologic errors in general
and of the frequency and clinical consequences of radiologic misinterpretations in the
trauma setting (13-19). More specifically, two recent studies have examined occurrence
and clinical consequences of radiologic errors in the emergency room. First, Wechsler et
al. (13) compared the preliminary interpretation of emergency body CT scans by residents
or fellows with the secondary review by attending radiologists and showed that major
discordance occurs in 1.2% (7/597) and minor discordance occurs in 6.5% (39/597). In
this study, there was no difference between discrepancy rates for trauma and nontrauma
cases. Second, Eachempati et al. (14) sought to determine whether trauma patients could
be discharged safely from the emergency department before the availability of official
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readings for their radiologic examinations by evaluating alterations of preliminary
readings in the emergency department and their effect on trauma patients. This study,
like Wechsler et al., compared the preliminary interpretation by radiology residents with
the secondary review by the attending radiologists by evaluating all radiologic studies
performed in the emergency department in one year period. The result showed that only
102 of 38,260 discharged emergency department patients had official readings differing
from preliminary readings. Of the 38,260 cases, 1073 cases were discharged trauma
patients. Of the 102 cases that had discrepant preliminary and official readings, 42 were
trauma cases. Thirty six of these 42 trauma cases were re-contacted for follow-up,
requiring 8 repeat visits and 1 subsequent hospitalization. The study concluded that
alterations of preliminary readings minimally affect outcomes of trauma patients.
However, discharged trauma patients are more likely to harbor alterations of preliminary
interpretations than other emergency department patients.

Other studies (15-19) also investigated the frequency and clinical consequences of
radiologic errors in the emergency department. Lai et al. (15) evaluated the frequency of
incorrect preliminary interpretations of neuroradiologic CT scans by on-call radiology
residents and the effect of such misinterpretations on clinical management and patient
outcome. This 9-month long prospective study compared preliminary interpretations by
on-call radiology residents with second review by attending radiologists next day. The
result showed that significant misinterpretations occurred in 0.9% (21/2388). There was
a significant change in patient management in 12 of the cases, with a potentially serious
change in patient outcome in two cases. Walsh-Kelly et al. (16) evaluated the clinical
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impact of radiograph misinterpretation in pediatric emergency department and the effect
of physician training level. Data were collected on 1,471 radiographs interpreted by
pediatric emergency medicine attendings and emergency medicine, pediatric and family
practice residents. These interpretations were then compared to the interpretation of a
board-certified pediatric radiologist. The result showed 200/1471 (14%)
misinterpretations. Non-radiology residents misinterpreted 16% of their radiographs
versus 11% for pediatric emergency medicine attendings. Furthermore, only 20/1471
(1.4%) radiographs had clinically significant misinterpretations with no morbidity
resulting from the delay in correct interpretation, demonstrating that radiograph
misinterpretation by emergency department physicians occurs but is unlikely to result in
significant morbidity.

In a different study, Roszler et al. (17) attempted to determine the accuracy of the
residents’ interpretations of emergency cranial CT scans done after working hours.
During a 2-month period, a total of 289 cranial CT scans were retrospectively reviewed
and the resident interpretation was judged acceptable, minor error, moderate error, or
major error. The result showed that 6/289 (2%) neurologic examinations had four
moderate and two major errors, with the mistakes all involving misinterpretation of
cerebral hemorrhage. In another study done by Klein et al. (18), discordant radiograph
interpretation between emergency physicians and radiologists in a pediatric emergency
department was compared. In this prospective cohort study performed in a 13-month
study period, 2083 radiographs were coded by the radiologist as concordant or discordant.
Three hundred forty-nine of 2083 studies were coded as discordant. More importantly,
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23/324 (7%), or 23/2083 (1.1%) overall, radiographs had potentially significant changes
in patient management and outcome. This study concluded that the presence of
radiologists to immediately read radiographs 24 hours a day could prevent missed
findings. However, the cost effectiveness of such practice may not be justifiable given
the small number of significant misinterpretations.

Lufkin et al. (19) had a different approach from the emergency medicine
physicians’ point of view with a hypothesis that radiologists’ review of radiographs
interpreted confidently by emergency physicians infrequently leads to changes in patient
management. This prospective descriptive study compared radiologic interpretations
between emergency department physicians and board-certified radiologists to determine
whether radiologists’ review is unwarranted when emergency department physicians are
confident in their interpretations. The study showed that emergency department
physicians were confident in 9,599 sets of radiographs out of a total of 16,410 (58%).
Discordant interpretation rates for the “confident'’ and “not confident” groups were 1.2%
and 3.1% respectively. Review of the 118 discordant interpretations in the confident
group demonstrated that 11 were significant. Since total radiology review charges for the
confident group were $215,338, the average radiology charge for each significant
discordant interpretation was $19,576. This cost analysis, in the authors’ opinion, did not
seem to justify the standard practice of radiologists’ review of all emergency department
radiographs.

Overall, the literature review revealed only a few prospective studies of
interventions designed to reduce reading error although several interventions, ranging
from 24-hour radiologist review, to standardized checklists for high-risk misreadings, to
regular conferences designed to prevent those errors may potentially show promises to
reduce radiologic errors (11). Furthermore, the previously described studies (13-19)
compared interpretations by radiology residents, fellows, or non-radiology attending
physicians with attending radiologists, not between attending radiologists. Although
these studies shed much light on occurrence and significance of discordant readings
between physicians, the main objective of these studies was to determine the effect of
training and experience in radiologic interpretations. Our study, in contrast, compares the
interpretations between attending radiologists in order to investigate the rate and clinical
significance of discordant interpretations and the use of redundant systems.

One of the characteristics of highly reliable industries includes high levels of
redundancy in personnel and safety measures (5). For example, a Swiss chess model may
be used to describe the redundant system as many layers in a system work to prevent error
and maintain high quality. However, when the holes that appear in each layer happen to
line up, an unfavorable error may occur. By creating more layers, one can prevent the
chance that the holes in all layers line up at the same time. To achieve this, in April 1999,
our institution established a new quality assurance (QA) system that complemented our
existing 24 hour/day 7 day per week coverage by an attending radiologist in the
emergency room. Every non-conventional radiographic imaging study done in an
emergency department patient is interpreted by the attending radiologist in the emergency
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department and subsequently reviewed by a subspecialty attending radiologist within the
next 24 hours. During the first two years of this QA program, no formal analysis of the
value of this approach has been undertaken.

In this study, we hypothesized that clinically significant improvement of patient
management and outcome occurs with our quality assurance program. The purpose of
our study, therefore, was to evaluate the use of a redundant system in improving quality
of care in the trauma setting by examining a subset of our QA program. This study will
serve not only as an internal review of the efficacy of the Yale radiology system, but it
will provide valuable insight into reducing medical errors to prevent mortality and
morbidity. By publishing our result in Radiology, we hope to contribute to the current
ongoing research on the study of medical errors, particularly in emergency radiology.
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESIS:
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the use of a redundant system in
improving quality of care in the trauma setting by examining a small part of our QA
program. We hypothesized that clinically significant improvement of patient
management and outcome occurs with our quality assurance program. We sought to
confirm this hypothesis by analyzing a subset of data for patient management and
outcome by focusing on abdominal/pelvic CT studies performed in the setting of acute
trauma. We conducted a retrospective study of abdominal/pelvic CT studies performed
on trauma patients for one year and evaluated the data for the frequency and clinical
consequences of misinterpretations.
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METHODS:
We retrospectively reviewed 531 consecutive abdominal/pelvic CT studies
performed on trauma patients, in an urban university-affiliated Level I trauma center,
from 08/22/99 to 08/21/00. Nineteen studies which did not contain the QA reader’s
comments or names were excluded from analysis, resulting in 512 in our study. Further
excluded are 182 chest/abdomen/pelvis CT studies, 11 pelvic CT studies, and 2
abdominal CT studies. Seven follow-up abdominal/pelvic CT studies performed on
previously studied patients were also excluded from analysis. As mentioned previously,
since April, 1999 in accordance with our QA program, every non-conventional
radiographic study (CT, MR, ultrasound, and nuclear medicine) done in an emergency
department patient has received a preliminary interpretation by an attending radiologist,
“the primary reader”, in the emergency department and a secondary review by a
subspecialty attending radiologist, “the QA reader”, within 24 hours of the initial
interpretation.

The original report is generated during the emergency department evaluation by
the primary reader using a voice recognition system, thus allowing for the immediate
generation of a hard-copy text report. The QA report is generated through hand-written
comments on a copy of the original report, with the QA reader’s initials. The report is
then returned to the primary reader for re-review. At the discretion of the primary reader,
the report is addended. When there is a major discordance, the QA reader immediately
contacts the primary reader as long as he or she is available. The case is discussed; and
o

the clinicians are subsequently contacted. If the primary reader cannot be reached, the
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QA reader contacts the clinicians immediately and may addend the report. All the QA
reports are archived after the recheck process is complete. The Radiology Information
System (IDX Rad, IDX Corporation, Burlington, VT) archives final reports but does not
incorporate the rechecking physician or his comments in the electronic record. The 512
consecutive abdominal/pelvic CT studies in our study represent a subset of our overall
data and include both adult patients and pediatric patients in the ED. This study was
approved by the Human Investigation Committee of our institution. Informed consent
was not required by the Human Investigation Committee for this study.

For each case, name, age, sex, clinical indication, names of primary and QA
readers, traumatic abdominal/pelvic findings, traumatic extra abdominal/pelvic findings,
and incidental findings were obtained and recorded. All 512 studies were then divided
into two main categories: 1) complete concordance of interpretations and 2) discordance
of interpretations. The findings identified by the QA reader and handwritten on the
original report were considered “discordant.” Discordant findings were then further
categorized into three sub-categories: a) discordance of incidental, non-clinically
significant findings, b) concordance of findings but discordance of interpretation, and c)
discordance of potentially clinically significant findings. The categorization of the
findings, when ambiguous, was determined by the consensus of three readers. Comments
by the QA reader regarding anatomic variation (e.g., normal sized retroperitoneal nodes
or retro-aortic left renal veins) or incidental observation (e.g., tampon in vagina; correctly
placed nasogastric tube or Foley catheter) were not considered as discordant readings.
The findings were then re-organized into three categories: 1) abdomen/pelvis trauma, 2)
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non-abdomen/pelvis trauma, and 3) incidental findings. Data collected were stored and
organized using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.

The primary readers consist of 21 board-certified or board-eligible radiologists
with varying years of experiences ranging from less than one year to more than 20 years.
Five out of the 21 primary readers were trained in body CT fellowship. One primary
reader had a specific training in emergency radiology. The QA readers consist of 18
subspecialty radiologists also with varying years of experiences ranging from less than
one year to more than 20 years. The QA reader reviewed all the cases regardless of the
training background of the primary reader. For each individual reader (both primary and
QA readers), a database using Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was created that shows the
number of disagreed interpretations, the number of agreed interpretations, and the total
number of cases read.

For the studies with discordant interpretations, additional data were obtained by 1)
review of the patient medical record, 2) review of the correlated record of the Department
of Trauma Surgery Morbidity and Mortality Conferences, and 3) re-evaluation of the final
imaging reports and additional imaging studies. First, patient medical records of all the
cases with discordant interpretations were obtained and reviewed to determine the clinical
significance of these interpretations. Re-admission, new operation, new treatment, or
new diagnostic studies (both imaging and laboratory) as a result of discordant second
readings were considered clinically significant. Second, the records of the Department of
Trauma Surgery Morbidity and Mortality Conferences were utilized to match ‘"morbidity

*
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and mortality” cases with discordant interpretations. The cases with a “positive match”
were further reviewed to determine whether morbidity and/or mortality resulted from
radiologic misinterpretation or other unrelated issues. Third, the final diagnostic imaging
reports on all the cases with discordant interpretations were obtained, reviewed, and
classified as “no change”, “edited”, or “with an addendum”. For each case, subsequent
imaging studies were reviewed by using IDX Rad, and new imaging studies as a result of
discordant readings were used to determine whether the preliminary or the QA
interpretation was accurate.
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RESULTS:
Of the 512 trauma cases, 153 cases (153/512; 29.9%) showed discordant readings
between the preliminary interpretation by attending radiologists in the ED (primary
readers) and the QA review by subspecialty abdominal imaging radiologists (QA readers).
The 512 studies comprise only abdominal/pelvic CT studies performed on the initial ED
encounter with complete information on QA readers’ identification and comments.

Review of all 153 patient records demonstrated that change in patient
management occurred in 12 cases (12/153; 7.8%) (Table 1). One re-admission occurred
as the patient was found to have adrenal hemorrhage by the QA reader. This patient,
contacted at home, was subsequently sent home after physical examination and laboratory
work showed no sequelae. In three patients, new diagnostic studies were requested and
performed for suspected traumatic findings identified by the QA reader. In one patient,
the QA reader identified possible pneumomediastinum, so the patient underwent swallow
studies to rule out esophageal perforation. The result of the study was negative, and the
patient was reassured. In the remaining two patients, the QA reader identified liver
lacerations which were missed by the primary reader. Both patients were placed under
strict bed rest, and serial hematocrit checks were performed for 1-2 days which delayed
their discharge. Both patients were found to be stable and were safely discharged home.

In three patients, changes in patient management occurred although new findings
identified by the QA reader were not trauma related (Table 1). Although the reason for
ordering CT studies for these three patients was to rule out traumatic injuries, the QA
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reader identified non-traumatic pathological findings in the CT studies that warranted
further follow up. One patient received full laboratory evaluation (liver function tests,
coagulation studies and hepatitis panel) for suspected cirrhosis that was identified for the
first time by the QA reader. As a result of laboratory findings, the patient was diagnosed
with hepatitis since hepatitis B and C antibodies were shown to be positive. The patient
was also scheduled for an endoscopy for suspected esophageal varices as an outpatient.
Another patient was found to have dilated loops of small bowels with thickened walls
consistent with an inflammatory process by the QA reader. Gastroenterology was
consulted, and the patient was treated with antibiotics. The last patient was found to have
a left ovarian lesion suspicious for cystadenoma by the QA reader. The referring
physician was notified of the finding. A new gynecology consult recommended follow up
studies, but the patient refused further work-up in this case.

There are other changes in patient management that took place due to the new
findings identified by the QA reader (Table 1). In one patient, the primary reader
identified a mesenteric hematoma which turned out to be a normal variant as the QA
reader reviewed the study. In this case, additional work-up for the patient was avoided
due to the QA process. In three patients, new bone fractures were identified by the QA
reader. In one patient, orthopedic and pain management was consulted for presumed
acute vertebral compression fractures identified by the QA reader, and the patient had a
corset placement to stabilize the fracture. The QA reader also identified a rib fracture in
another patient who received Percocet for pain relief. In the third patient, there was a
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questionable fracture at left ischium/pubic ramus transition. The patient was contacted,
but the patient refused to come back to the hospital for re-evaluation.
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TABLE 1

Clinical Consequences of Discordant Interpretation of Abdominal/Pelvic CT Scans on
Trauma Patients
Patient
age/ sex

Primary
interpretation

Quality Assurance (QA)
Interpretation

Change in management

8
months/
female
f44
years/
male

Mesenteric
hematoma

No mesenteric hematoma

Avoided additional work-up

Normal

Liver nodules consistent with cirrhosis

New laboratory values
ordered for LFT's,
coagulation factors,
hepatitis panel. Endoscopy
appointment for varices as
outpatient

No fracture

Questionable fracture at left
ischium/pubic ramus transition

Patient called but patient
refused to come back to
hospital

No fracture

Transverse process fracture of LI

33
years/
male

Normal

Right adrenal hemorrhage

Orthopedic and pain
management consults.
Corset placement
Patient brought back to
emergency room for reevaluation and discharged
after normal exam

50
years/
male

Normal

Pneumomediastinum

swallow studies to rule out
esophageal perforation

*65
years/
male

Normal

Liver laceration

Strict bed rest. Checked
hematocrit every 6 hours.
Discharge delayed for 3
days.

*80
years/
female

Normal

Bladder rupture

Urology consult with Foley
catheter placement

92
years/
male

Normal

Rib fracture

Percocet given for pain

*88
years/
female

Normal

Multiple liver lacerations

t31

Normal

Dilated loops of small bowels with

Trauma surgery consult.
Checked hematocrit every
24 hours. Discharge delayed
for 2 days
Gastroenterology consult.

17
years/
female
35
years/
female

19

years/
male

+91
years/
female

Normal

thickened walls consistent with an
inflammatory process. May be due to
Crohn’s disease or an infectious
process

Treatment with antibiotics

Left ovarian lesion suspicious for
cystadenoma

Gynecology consult. Patient
refused further workup

*cases also recorded in morbidity and mortality records in the Department of Trauma.
+ non-trauma findings.
Abbreviations
LFT’s : liver function tests

Our attempt to correlate the morbidity and mortality cases of the Department of
Trauma Surgery with the 153 discordant cases resulted in 13 “matched’'’ cases. Of the 13
“matched” cases, 10 cases were unrelated to diagnostic imaging studies. Three cases
were directly related to delay in reporting of discordant diagnostic imaging findings
(Table 1). Of these, two were due to delay in diagnosis of liver lacerations that required
further laboratory evaluation to monitor hematocrit and resulted in lengthened
hospitalization stay. One case involved a suspected bladder injury that required urology
consult, placement of a Foley catheter and an additional imaging study for re-evaluation
which showed normal bladder.

Review of the final diagnostic imaging reports in the discordant cases
demonstrated 1) no change made to preliminary reports in 95 cases (95/153; 62.1%), 2)
changes edited into final reports in 27 cases (27/153; 17.6%), and 3) addenda to final
reports in 31 cases (31/153; 20.3%). Furthermore, review of subsequent diagnostic
imaging studies for the discordant cases showed that 6 cases (6/153; 3.9%) had additional
diagnostic imaging studies for re-evaluation. Although the QA reader recommended
various follow-up imaging studies for re-evaluation in 13 cases, follow-up studies were
performed in only 6 cases. These data, however, only include procedures performed at
our institution. As shown in Table 2, 4 out of the 6 cases confirmed the findings by the
QA reader: two liver lacerations, bowel loops instead of anomalous veins, and a rib
fracture with a hemorrhagic renal cyst. The remaining 2 cases favor the initial
interpretation. In both cases, the suspected bladder injuries by the QA reader actually
turned out to be normal by follow-up CT cystogram.
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TABLE 2

Follow-up Diagnostic Imaging Studies in Cases with Discordant Interpretation
Initial
interpretation

Second interpretation

New study
ordered

Final interpretation

Consensus
with QA

Normal

Liver lacerations

Liver laceration

Yes

Normal

Liver lacerations

Liver lacerations

Yes

Anomalous
vein

No anomalous vein,
bowel loops

CT
Abdomen/pelvis
CT
Abdomen/pelvis
CT
Abdomen/pelvis

Yes

Normal
Normal

Bladder rupture

CT cystogram

No anomalous vein.
Normal bowel
loops
No bladder injury

Bladder rupture

CT cystogram

Diverticula in
bladder, no bladder
rupture

No

Normal

Rib fractures and left
renal hypoattenuation

CT
Abdomen/pelvis
and ultrasound

Rib fractures and
left hemorrhagic
renal cyst

Yes

No
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Lastly, Table 3 classifies every radiologic finding made by the primary reader and
the QA reader into various categories. All in all, there are 1,133 findings identified in
512 CT studies. 203/1,133 (17.9%) describe abdominal/pelvic trauma. 244/1,133
(21.5%) describe traumatic findings that occurred outside of abdomen and pelvis.
686/1,133 (60.5%) describe incidental findings as agreed by the consensus of three
investigators. These findings were also categorized according to the criteria described in
Methods: 1) complete concordance, 2) discordance of incidental, non-clinically
significant findings, 3) concordance of findings but discordance of interpretation, and 4)
discordance of potentially clinically significant findings. 892/1,133 (78.7%) shows
complete concordance between the primary reader and the QA reader. 127/1,133 (11.2%)
shows discordance of incidental, non-clinically significant findings. 29/1,133 (2.6%)
shows concordance of findings with discordance of interpretation. 85/1,133 (7.5%)
shows discordance of potentially clinically significant findings.
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TABLE 3
Classification of Radiologic Findings
abd/pelvis
trauma

nonabd/pelvis
trauma

incidental

TOTAL

163

214

515

892

0

0

127

127

10

2

17

29

Discordance of potentially
clinically significant findings

30

28

27

85

TOTAL

203

244

686

1133

Complete concordance
Discordance of incidental, nonclinically significant findings
Concordance of findings with
discordance of interpretation

DISCUSSION:
Previous studies on medical errors
Even before the Institute of Medicine report in 1999, there were studies that raised
public attention regarding medical errors. In 1991, Brennan et al. published a landmark
study on incidence of inpatient adverse events, including those due to negligence (3).
This study was the first of the two studies that were based on the Harvard Medical
Practice. The authors concluded that patients experience a substantial number of
iatrogenic injuries and that more than a fourth of those are due to substandard care. In the
same year, this group released another study that classified the adverse events as drug
complications, wound infections and technical complications as the most common types
of error (10). The result suggested that many errors are preventable and that the study of
errors, epidemiology and prevention can reduce incidence. In 1994, Dr. Leape, one of the
leading authors in the previous Harvard Medical Practice studies, proposed several
reasons for high error rate in medicine compared to other industries (such as aviation) (4).
One reason may be a lack of awareness of the severity of the problem in the medical
community. Second, most errors in medicine do no harm. But the most important reason
is that physicians and nurses have a great deal of difficulty in dealing with human error
when it does occur. This stems from the expectation that providers function without error
as role models in medical education reinforce the concept of infallibility. Finally, the
realities of the malpractice threat provide strong incentives against disclosure or
investigation of errors. Leape suggested that the first step in reducing medical error is for
practitioners to accept that they are fallible. Then as contributing factors are recognized
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and studied, adverse events can be anticipated and reduced. However, although these
studies received some attention around the medical community and the media, the subject
of medical errors did not become the focal point of public attention until 1999.

In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released the first report, To Error is
Human: Building a Safer Health System, in a series of an initiative to develop a strategy
for improving the quality of health care in America. The report sent shock waves
throughout the medical community as it estimated that up to 98,000 Americans die each
year as a result of preventable medical errors which was more than motor vehicle
accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS (5). “Errors” were defined as “the failure to complete a
planned action as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim; not all errors
result in harm.” This reported recommended for 50 percent reduction in errors over the
next five years and provided a four-tiered approach to implement changes. First, it
recommended establishing a national focus to create leadership, research, tools, and
protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety within the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ). Second, the IOM report called for identifying and
learning from medical errors through both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems
and at the same time protecting reporting systems from being used in litigation. Third,
the IOM report sought to raise standards and expectations for improvements in safety
through the actions of oversight organizations, group purchasers, and professional groups.
Fourth, the IOM report recommended implementing safe practices at the delivery level.

26

Building upon the first report, the Institute of Medicine released the second report.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: a New Health System for the 21st Century, on medical errors
in 2001, outlining the major steps that should be taken in overhauling the U.S. health care
system (6). This report suggested that Congress should create an “innovation fund” of $1
billion to help subsidize promising projects and communicate the need for rapid and
significant change throughout the health system. Furthermore, this report detailed a 5part strategy for building a stronger health care system. First, the report encouraged
improvements in six areas in patient care to be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely,
efficient, and equitable. Second, ten new rules to redesign and improve care in guiding
patient-clinician relationships were introduced: care based on continuous healing
relationships, customization based on patient needs and values, the patient as the source
of control, shared knowledge and the free flow of information, evidence-based decision¬
making, safety as a system property, the need for transparency, anticipation of needs,
continuous decrease in waste, and cooperation among clinicians. Third, health care
system should be focused on the development of evidence-based approaches to care,
especially in treatment of chronic diseases. Fourth, more supportive organizational
process among health care organizations, clinicians and patients need to be created. This
part of the five-part strategy calls for use of information technologies. Lastly, the
committee emphasized changes in four key areas: more effective processes for the
diffusion of clinical knowledge to providers and patients, use of information technologies
to support clinical decision making, change in methods of payment, and appropriately
preparing the work force for new challenges.
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In response to these reports, two government groups, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the Quality Interagency Coordination (QuIC)
Taskforce, have taken action to implement changes in health care, inform the public, and
provide research opportunities for studying medical errors (7,8,9). By February 2000, the
Quality Interagency Coordination (QuIC) Task Force responded to the Institute of
Medicine report and to President Clinton. In this report (7), the QuIC Task force listed
each IOM recommendation from To Error is Human: Building a Safer Health System
alongside responsive actions the QuIC will take in an errors reduction agenda with the
creation of a center for patient safety within the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality. Since then, this center in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality has
conducted further research on medical errors and attempted to implement changes in our
health care system as recommended by the Institute of Medicine.

One such area of research involves the identification and reduction of diagnostic
errors and the study of system-specific causes (8). First, diagnostic inaccuracies may lead
to incorrect and ineffective treatment or unnecessary testing, which is costly and
sometimes invasive. For example, in obstetrics and gynecology, one study showed that
physicians who performed 100 or more colposcopies a year had more accurate findings
than physicians who performed the procedure less often (20). Likewise, in diagnostic
imaging, studies that compared resident versus attending radiologists have shown that
experience appeared to decrease discrepancy rates (13). This study investigated the
effects of training and experience in interpretation of emergency body CT scans by
comparing discrepancies between junior residents, senior residents and fellows with

-
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attending radiologists. Of 598 CT studies, fellows demonstrated statistically significantly
lower discrepancy rates than did senior or junior residents (5.9%, 13.7%, and 13.3%
respectively). Second, although errors in medication, surgery, and diagnosis are the
easiest to detect, medical errors may result more frequently from the organization of
health care delivery and the way that resources are provided to the delivery system (8).
The study of system-specific causes of medical errors is more difficult to perform and
involves many more variables. Our study attempts to address these two issues, the
identification and reduction of diagnostic errors and the study of system-specific causes,
by studying the use of a redundant system to detect and correct image interpretation errors
in the trauma setting.

Characteristics of highly reliable industries include an organizational commitment
to safety, high levels of redundancy in personnel and safety measures, and a strong
organizational culture for continuous learning and willingness to change (5). Use of
redundant systems has been successfully employed in other industries such as military
aircraft carriers or chemical processing. By providing multiple layers of check points, use
of redundant systems in aviation has dramatically reduced potential disasters.

Aviation is an industry that depends its existence on safety. In aviation, a safety
culture is more than a set of guidelines; it is a behavior that governs the culture and belief
of every member. Helmreich in his work, Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine (2),
discusses and compares error management in aviation and medicine. In aviation, there
exists a professional culture that actively encourages discussion, research, and strategies
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to prevent potential errors. Helmreich points out that both in aviation and medicine there
are five precepts for error management (2):
1.

In any complex system, human error is inevitable. In systems such as aviation and
medicine, where teams interact with technology, errors will occur.

2.

There are limitations on human performance. All humans have limits imposed by
cognitive capabilities such as the capacity of memory.

3.

When performance limits are exceeded, humans make more errors. When overloaded
or under stress, decision-making ability is hampered.

4.

Safety is a universal value. In every culture, members value and strive to increase it.
Safety does not come free although organizations differ in the resources they can
devote to safety.

5. High-risk organizations have a responsibility to develop and maintain a safety culture.
The task is to make sure that individuals and teams accept their responsibility for
safety and error management.
Although there are many commonalties between aviation and medicine, aviation appears
to be far ahead in reduction and management of errors. To achieve the highest level of
safety, the airline industry aggressively pursues the use of redundant systems to provide
multiple layers to check points to prevent errors. Furthermore, it devotes a lot of
resources to conduct research to study, learn, and improve the existing system. Finally, in
aviation, incident reporting systems are strictly confidential in order to promote a safe
environment for learning from potential errors rather than a hostile setting that assigns
blames on the individuals involved.

r
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Errors in radiology and evaluation of our department’s QA process
Using the concept of highly redundant systems to improve safety, in April 1999,
our institution established a new quality assurance (QA) system that complemented our
existing 24 hour/day 7 day per week coverage by an attending radiologist in the
emergency room. As described previously, every non-conventional radiographic study
(CT, MR, ultrasound, and nuclear medicine) done in an emergency department patient
has received a preliminary interpretation by an attending radiologist, “the primary reader”,
in the emergency department and a secondary review by a subspecialty attending
radiologist, “the QA reader”, within 24 hours of the initial interpretation. Our study
examined the use of this redundant system in improving quality of care in the trauma
setting.

As discussed in introduction, previous studies have investigated the subject of
radiologic errors in general and of the frequency and clinical consequences of radiologic
misinterpretations in the trauma setting (13-19). Although many of the errors are due to
disagreement in interpretations and often do not result in a change in clinical management
and outcome, some of the “missed” findings do result in unfavorable clinical
consequences. Studies by Wechsler et al. (13) that compared the preliminary
interpretation of emergency body CT scans by residents or fellows with the secondary
review by attending radiologists and by Eachempati et al. (14) that evaluated alterations
of preliminary readings in the emergency department and their effect on trauma patients
compared the preliminary interpretation by radiology residents with the secondary review
by the attending radiologists. Other studies (15- 19) also investigated the frequency and

clinical consequences of radiologic errors in the emergency department. All of these
studies (13-19), however, compared interpretations by radiology residents, fellows, or
non-radiology attending physicians with attending radiologists, not between attending
radiologists. The main objective of these studies was to determine the effect of training
and experience in radiologic interpretations.

Our study is different from previous investigations in that we compared the
interpretations between attending radiologists, focusing on one subset of our QA
program: abdominal/pelvic CT studies performed on trauma patients. Our discordance
rate of 29.9% (153/512) is higher compared to the previous study by Wechsler et al. (13).
However, there are important differences between these two studies. Our study
retrospectively reviewed discordant interpretations between attending radiologists while
Wechsler et al. prospectively examined discordant interpretations between residents or
fellows and attending radiologists. Although 153 of 512 cases had discordant
interpretations, only 12 of 153 cases resulted in perceived changes in patient
management. One case was of major concern as the patient needed to return to the
emergency department for re-examination. The other 11 of 12 cases required additional
diagnostic studies, laboratory values, new medications for pain and possible infection,
and specialty consults. It is also important to note that 3 of 12 cases are due to significant
non-trauma findings: a suspected cirrhosis, an inflammatory small bowel process, and a
suspected ovarian cystadenoma. In the remaining 141 of 153 cases, new findings made
by the QA reader did not affect the clinical management of the patients.
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The average error rate among radiologists has been around 30% from studies
dating from 1949 to 1992 (21, 22). In 1949, in his presidential address at the thirty-fourth
annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America, Dr. Garland (21) stated
that radiologists are far less than perfect when it comes to accurately reading and
interpreting radiographs. Discordance in interpreting radiographs was measured by a
study of the relative frequency with which a reader was inconsistent with other readers
(mter-individual variation) and with himself on two separate readings of the same set of
films (mfra-individual variation). The degree of zwter-individual variation was from 9 to
24 percent. The degree of infra-individual variation was from 3 to 31 percent, which was
surprising since the same reader missed the findings of the same set of films on two
separate readings. Overall, interpretations of chest radiographs “missed” the pathological
findings completely nearly 20% of the time, while close to 50% involved significant
disagreements about the radiographic findings. This early study showed that the
interpretation of radiographs is subject to a certain degree of inherent error and
encouraged radiologists to be involved in improving the methods of describing lesions
accurately and rational evaluation of existing classifications.

In 1975, after twenty-five years later, Herman et al. (23) obtained similar results
among a group of Harvard University radiologists. Each of 100 chest radiographs, rich in
abnormal findings, were read by five experienced radiologists who disagreed on the
interpretation of chest radiographs as much as 56% of the time. Moreover, forty-one
percent of the reports contained potentially significant errors. Three years later, the same
group of researchers published another study that attempted to improve performance by
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multiple interpretations of chest radiographs (24). Like the previous study (23), this study
also had 100 chest radiographs, randomly selected from a hospital population, initially
interpreted by eight radiologists. By using a method of duplicate reading, named
“pseudoarbitration”, a third independent interpretation was used to resolve disagreement
between pairs of readers. This method reduced errors 37% and increased correct
interpretations 18%. This study demonstrated the advantage of using multiple
interpretations to improve in accuracy. Other factors such as implications for patient care
and additional costs were considered and discussed.

In a more recent study at the Yale University School of Medicine, Elmore (25) revealed a
disturbing variability in the radiologists’ diagnostic interpretations, clinical accuracies, and
management recommendations in reading mammograms. Radiologists in this study had
substantial clinical disagreements in their diagnoses in up to 33% of the patients, and they
disagreed in their management recommendations in up to 25% of the patients. The reasons for
discordance according to the participating radiologists include differences in visual perception,
differences in diagnostic criteria, and varying thresholds of concern. The researchers, led by
principal investigator Alvan R. Feinstein, concluded that although mammography is of value in
screening women for breast cancer, radiologists can differ, sometimes substantially, in their
interpretations of mammograms and in their recommendations for management. Therefore, more
efforts to improve accuracy and reduce variability in interpretation are needed to increase the
effectiveness of mammography in detecting early breast cancers.
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Although many of the errors are due to disagreement in interpretations and often
do not result in a change in clinical management and outcome, some of the “missed”
findings do result in unfavorable clinical consequences. Such “missed” findings often
have far reaching ethical and legal consequences, and the ethical and medicolegal
considerations of radiologic errors have been the subject of an ongoing debate for many
years (26, 27). Leonard Berlin, who extensively studied the medicolegal issues in
radiology and authored many articles in the topic, encouraged radiological societies on
both national and local level to develop a “standard of radiological practice” which can be
used for medicolegal purposes (27). Since errors in diagnostic radiology will continue to
occur, we need to ascertain whether the error is due to negligence or not. If the error is
due to negligence, which means that in the eyes of the court or jury no reasonable
radiologist in similar circumstances would have made the error, then the defendant is
guilty of malpractice and compensation to the injured patient is allowable. All interested
parties should also provide review panels that would evaluate an alleged error and render
an opinion as to whether or not it conformed to those standards. In his opinion, if such
formal standards and review panels were developed and used successfully, the number of
malpractice suits involving radiologists would decrease significantly.

In our study, it should be noted that the two readers, in each case, do not
necessarily differ in their training level, as sub-specialty abdominal imagers function, at
times, as primary emergency department radiologists. The difference, then, has much to
do with the setting of the reading, and the proximity to clinical information. On the one
hand, the emergency department radiologist is advantaged by knowing much more detail
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about the current status of the patient, mechanism of injury and key clinical concerns. On
the other hand, the environment of interpretation, in a level I trauma center, with very
high volume, makes this setting less than optimal for the most diligent radiologists.

The other important area of finding involved the follow-up of the discordant
cases. Of the 153 cases, only 58 cases (37.9%) showed changes (edits, addenda) made in
the final reports. The remaining 95 cases (95/153; 62.1%) had identical preliminary and
final reports. This finding suggests that the primary reader, more often than not, finds the
QA reader’s suggestion to be not significant enough to warrant changes to the original
report. Further, review of subsequent diagnostic imaging studies for re-evaluation in 6
cases allowed us to ascertain whether the consensus lies with the primary reader or the
QA reader. These additional imaging studies were performed at the QA reader’s
recommendation if the original studies raised any suspicion for pathologic findings which
could not be adequately identified initially. In 4 of 6 cases, the subsequent studies agreed
with the QA reader’s interpretation. The remaining 2 cases favored the initial
interpretation.

Our findings bring to light two important issues. First, our QA program serves an
important purpose in identifying clinically significant, however infrequent, findings that
are missed by the primary reader. The demonstration of changes in patient management
suggests that the communication line between the QA reader, the primary reader, and the
responsible clinician functions to improve patient care when needed. Second, despite the
high rate of discordant interpretations (29.9%), most are not significant and do not result
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in a change in patient management. Only 7.8% of the discordant readings (12/153) and
2.3% (12/512) of the total resulted in a change in patient management.

There are several limitations of this study. First, compliance with our QA system
among the primary and QA readers is not perfect. There were 19 cases that were
excluded from our data set because there was no name or comment from the QA reader.
In our review of these records, there is no indication that these cases would represent
“errors” as no follow-up imaging has occurred and no mention in the records of the
Trauma Surgery department. Still, we cannot confirm what the QA findings would have
been at the time. Second, this study did not provide the rate of accuracy of interpretations
as measured against an infallible standard. Although the QA reader, with specialty
training in body imaging, is often more experienced in reading body CT scans than the
primary reader and certainly operating in a better setting for interpretation, in at least 2
cases the final interpretation favored the primary reader. Third, since this study focused
on trauma patients in the emergency room setting, many of the recommendations made by
the QA reader for further studies were often not followed up. After the patient is
discharged, it is often difficult to contact and bring the patient back for further studies
(14). Fourth, use of the medical record to identify cases that resulted in changes in
clinical management may have been potentially biased by the reviewer’s subjectivity.

In order to streamline our QA process, our department has recently hired a QA
coordinator to oversee our QA program as well as to ensure that the process includes all
cases, with appropriate documentation of the QA reader’s findings and name. Other
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efforts include encouraging more strict compliance by the attending radiologists and
reducing the lag time between the initial interpretation and the QA review. Further, it is
expected that the findings of such a program will eventually include proposals for
remediation or continuing medical education, if a given primary reader is found to be
deficient in an area of required expertise.

The cost of our QA program is relatively modest. For the most part, the attending
radiologists on the Body-CT service spend one to two hours daily reviewing the previous
24 hour’s cases. It is our estimation (after a sampling of 5 QA readers) that this process
requires a full-time equivalent (FTE) for every 36 cases, and thus 14 days of a FTE are
required for the total sample in this study. At our marginal cost of $800 dollars per day,
this amounts to $11,200 for the detection of the 13 management-changing cases. Thus,
the cost of detection is below $1000 per case. This is not the entire cost of the program as
there are administrative costs and clerical labor, but this is a fair approximation of the
marginal cost of professional time.

Another concern regarding the QA program pertains to liability. Although 153 of
512 cases contained discordant interpretations, it is presumptuous to label them as 153
“errors”. Many of the 153 cases are often due to incidental additional findings of
minimal clinical consequence. Reporting the “missed” radiologic diagnosis involves
serious medicolegal and ethical considerations. Although our QA program is streamlined
to report potentially significant missed findings and make necessary changes in the final
report immediately, this practice is certainly not in place for many other institutions.
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Rather, many radiologists in this country often face a dilemma when it comes to reporting
“missed” radiologic diagnosis. For example (26), the following dilemma is familiar to
many radiologists. The radiologist notices a spiculated, solid lung lesion with the typical
appearance of carcinoma. He then checks the interpretation of the radiographs obtained a
year ago and notices that the study was interpreted as normal. The radiologist then places
the actual radiographs obtained one year ago on the view box and observes. To his
dismay, the lung lesion was present on the original radiographs but was not noticed and
thus not reported. A dilemma emerges: should the radiologists include in the report and
inform the referring physician that the currently detected lesion was indeed present on
previous radiographs but was missed, or should the radiologists remain silent on the
content of the original images?

This dilemma occurs too often for radiologists. With the presumed discordance
rate of 30% amongst radiologists, as discussed previously, the socioeconomic impact of
“missed” diagnosis can lead to the growth in malpractice litigation, financial awards paid,
and many aggrieved patients. Berlin (26) suggests that no single compelling argument
can resolve this dilemma. However, the preponderance of legal opinion favors complete
disclosure by the physician of all facts and information relevant to a patient’s health or
well-being, including complications of medical procedures and iatrogenic errors and
injuries. Furthermore, from an ethical point of view, failure to disclose errors and
mistakes constitutes an unethical conduct. For the radiologists reporting previously
missed findings, they need to be careful when describing their findings, and words such
as “missed”, “error”, or “mistake” should be avoided in official reports. To maximize

legal defense strategies for potential malpractice suits, the report of the misdiagnosis
should be “succinct, matter-of-fact, and nonjudgmental” (26).

Conclusion: the impact of our findings
It is important that radiologists be interested in outcomes research. Outcomes
research was initially defined in the United States Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 as
“research with respect to patient outcomes of selected medical treatments and surgical
procedures for the purpose of assessing their appropriateness, necessity, and
effectiveness” (28). John Thombury, a renowned radiologist involved in outcomes
research, encouraged the radiologists to be more involved in this area of outcomes
research. In presenting the Eugene W. Caldwell Lecture at the annual meeting of the
American Roentgen Ray Society in 1993, Dr. Thombury clearly expressed his strong
opinion (29) that if radiologists grasp the global outcome-oriented primary goal and
become more involved and knowledgeable outcome-oriented consultants, they may then
be influential in changing physicians’ practices with regard to imaging selection and use.
This will provide higher quality patient care and result in improvement of patient well¬
being. In this way, imaging examinations and interpretations will be optimally used for
the most effective, efficient and highest quality patient care possible.

In order to assess the impact of this research on today’s practice of clinical
radiology and the patient management process in particular, we need to consider a
hierarchical model of efficacy by Fryback and Thombury (30). Efficacy is defined as “the
probability of benefit to individuals in a defined population from a medical technology
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for a given medical problem under ‘ideal' conditions of use” (31). This hierarchical
model of efficacy is presented as an organizing structure for appraisal of the literature on
efficacy of imaging (30):
Level 1. Technical efficacy
•

Resolution of line pairs

•

Modulation transfer function change

•

Gray-scale range

•

Amount of mottle

•

Sharpness

Level 2. Diagnostic accuracy efficacy
•
•

Yield of abnormal or normal diagnoses in a case series
Diagnostic accuracy (percentage correct diagnoses in case series)

•
•

Predictive value of positive or negative examination (in a case series)
Sensitivity and specificity in a defined clinical problem setting

•

Measures of ROC curve height (d’) or area under the curve Az

Level 3. Diagnostic thinking efficacy
• Number (percentage) of cases in a series in which image judged “helpful” to making
the diagnosis
•
•

Entropy change in differential diagnosis probability distribution
Difference in clinicians’ subjectively estimated diagnosis probabilities pre- to post¬
test information

•

Empirical subjective log-likelihood ration for test positive and negative in a case
series

Level 4. Therapeutic efficacy
•

Number (percentage) of times image judged helpful in planning management of the
patient in a case series

•

Percentage of times medical procedure avoided due to image information

•

Number or percentage of times therapy planned pretest changed after the image
information was obtained (retrospectively inferred from clinical records)

•

Number or percentage of times clinicians’ prospectively stated therapeutic choices
changed after test information

Level 5. Patient outcome efficacy
•

Percentage of patients improved with test compared with without test

•

Morbidity (or procedures) avoided after having image information

•
•

Change in quality-adjusted life expectancy
Expected value of test information in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)

•

Cost per QALY saved with image information
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Level 6. Societal efficacy
•
•

Benefit-cost analysis from societal viewpoint
Cost-effectiveness analysis from societal viewpoint

According Thombury, demonstration of efficacy at each lower level in this hierarchy is
logically necessary, but not sufficient, to assure efficacy at higher levels. Applying this
model, we can then assess the impact of our research on the field of radiology and today’s
health care system in general.

Our research, when compared to the Thombury hierarchical model of efficacy,
meets the criteria for levels 2, 3, and 4. Our study does not concern technical efficacy, so
it does not meet the criteria for Level 1. However, according to Thombury (32), Levels 2,
3, and 4 make up “clinical efficacy” for which our study meets all the criteria. Our study
concerns diagnostic-accuracy efficacy (Level 2). By providing a second attending level
radiologist as the QA reader, we are able to compare two attending level radiologists’
interpretations to arrive at more accurate diagnosis. In 6 cases, when there were
ambiguous interpretations, new imaging studies were performed and interpreted by
another radiologist to determine consensus. Our study also affects diagnostic-thinking
efficacy (Level 3). The communication between the primary radiologist and the QA
radiologist often clarifies discordant interpretations and leads to change in diagnostic
thinking process. Furthermore, the line of communication reaches further to the referring
physician, who is then re-educated on new findings. Thus, the referring physician’s
diagnostic thinking is improved by our QA process. Our study demonstrated that our QA
system affects therapeutic efficacy (Level 4). The review of the patient records and the
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mortality and morbidity conference records in the Department of Trauma Surgery
demonstrated that changes in patient management occur with our QA program. In this
level, the patient participates with the physician in evaluating imaging results and making
decisions about treatment choices. Some patients, when contacted about new findings,
chose to come back to the hospital for further examinations while others refused. Finally,
it is difficult to assess whether our study meets the criteria for Levels 5 and 6. A study
that involves patient-outcome efficacy (Level 5) traditionally requires a prospective,
randomized, controlled trial (32). At the highest level, societal efficacy (Level 6), the
study design must be efficacious to the extent that it advocates changes in societal
resources to provide medical benefits to society. Our QA program, despite its usefulness
to our department, has not been proven to demonstrate and meet this highest level of
efficacy.

Our findings show that clinically significant improvement of patient management
does occur with a quality assurance program using redundant systems. Although most
discordant interpretations do not result in a change in patient management, there are a
number of cases in which patients are managed differently as a result of new clinically
significant findings. As identification and reduction of medical errors become
increasingly important in health care, evaluation of the existing quality assurance
program, such as ours, will serve a useful purpose to monitor the efficacy of the current
system and to make necessary changes to improve the system. Moreover, we believe that
it will provide an invaluable educational experience for the housestaff and the attending
radiologists as they learn from discordant interpretations as well as actual errors.
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Through mutual feedback, both the primary and QA readers can improve areas of their
weaknesses and instruct the residents on commonly missed findings.

Our QA system may serve as a model for utilizing the concept of redundant
systems to prevent potential radiologic errors. We are not attempting to convince all
other hospitals to adopt this QA program as it will be unrealistic for smaller hospitals
with limited manpower in their radiology department. However, for larger academic
medical centers with a medical school affiliation, we hope that they will take interest in
our QA program and even consider adopting our program to suit their need. Our
experience with the current QA system for the last three years has shown better
coordinated care for the emergency department patients. Furthermore, emergency
physicians and trauma surgeons developed deeper appreciation and trust in radiologists’
interpretations. We, therefore, plan to continue with our current QA program for the
foreseeable future. For now, there is no active discussion to expand our program to cover
all studies performed at Yale-New Haven Hospital. We believe that current use of our
QA program to cover the emergency department is sufficient to meet our pressing need
without over-utilizing our resources.

Another study is currently underway to ascertain improvement of the accuracy rate
due to our QA program by comparing the data before and after the institution of our QA
program. This study will help us to have assurance that our QA system does indeed
decrease the error rate. Moreover, although our brief cost analysis showed that the cost of
our QA program is relative modest with about one third of a full time equivalent in the
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entire department, we need more rigorous cost analysis to further improve our QA system
to be more cost effective. Finally, we hope that our QA program will reduce discordance
over time although we cannot predict that eventually there will be a time when the
discordant rate will be low enough so that the system of reviewing the studies will not be
justified. As we publish our study in Radiology, we sincerely expect that other academic
institutions with adequate resources will consider our model to improve their radiology
QA system as we strive toward our ultimate goal: reduction and prevention of radiologic
errors.
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